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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
By this appeal, Rocky Mountain Claim Staking ("Rocky 
Mountain") seeks reversal of the District Court's Order vacating a 
Colorado default judgment against William Frandsen ("Frandsen") 
that was properly registered in Utah. In its appellate brief, 
Rocky Mountain demonstrated that Frandsen purposely established 
minimum contacts with the State of Colorado, such that he should 
have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Colorado to 
respond to claims arising out of his contacts with Colorado. 
Frandsen's purposeful contacts with Colorado included the 
following: (1) initiation of several telephone calls to Rocky 
Mountain in Colorado to conduct business discussions and solicit 
the performance of services by Rocky Mountain; (2) negotiation and 
entry into an agreement with Rocky Mountain during a telephone 
conversation Frandsen placed to Colorado; (3) execution and 
transmittal to Colorado of a negotiable instrument, a check, to be 
negotiated in Colorado; (4) initiation of a telephone call to 
jlorado to direct the completion of the negotiable instrument and 
its negotiation there; and (5) engaging in conduct that proximately 
caused injurious effects in Colorado by failing to ensure payment 
of the check sent to Colorado for negotiation. In short, Rocky 
Mountain demonstrated that Colorado's jurisdiction over Frandsen 
was consistent with due process because he purposely availed 
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himself of the privilege and benefits of doing business in 
Colorado. 
In an attempt to avoid the Colorado judgment, Frandsen ignores 
material facts and argues inconsistent positions. In addition, 
without analyzing the significance of his purposeful contacts with 
Colorado, Frandsen asserts that the Colorado court's exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over him violates due process. As set forth 
in the Brief of Appellant and below, these positions are without 
merit. Frandsen engaged in substantial, purposeful contacts with 
Colorado and, as such, the Colorado court properly exercised 
personal jurisdiction over him. 
ARGUMENT 
X. FRANDSEN HAS IGNORED MATERIAL FACTS THAT ESTABLISH PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION IN COLORADO AND HAS TAKEN INCONSISTENT POSITIONS 
CONCERNING HIS SELECTIVE VERSION OF THE FACTS, 
Frandsenf "as the judgment debtor seeking avoidance of the 
judgment, . . . [has the burden to overcome the] presumption of 
jurisdiction.M See Data Management Sys., Inc. v. EDP Corp.. 709 
P.2d 377, 380 (Utah 1985). Although Frandsen admits that the 
"Court must examine all of the facts and circumstances relative to 
Mr. Frandsen's contacts with Colorado," Frandsen argues for 
affirmance of the District Court's erroneous Order based upon a 
selectively incomplete version of the facts. (Brief of Appellee, 
p. 10.) 
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But all of the facts and circumstances relative to Mr. 
Frandsen's contacts with Colorado demonstrate that Frandsen 
purposely availed himself of the privilege and benefit of doing 
business in Colorado. 
Jurisdiction over Frandsen was asserted pursuant to Colorado's 
long-arm statute. Despite Frandsen's contentions to the contrary, 
the Utah Supreme Court has stated expressly in Data Management 
Systems, Inc. v. EDP Corp., 709 P.2d 377 (Utah 1985) that the 
appropriate inquiry is whether or not the exercise of such 
jurisdiction was proper under Colorado law. "The appropriate 
inquiry is whether service upon and the exercise of jurisdiction 
over [the defendant] in the [sister state] court was valid under 
fthe sister state's! laws. Id. at 380 (emphasis added) . The 
Colorado statute provides that the following activities subject an 
individual to the jurisdiction of the Colorado courts: 
(a) The transaction of any business within the state; 
(b) The commission of a tortious act within the state. 
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124. 
Frandsen has not disputed that he engaged in acts delineated 
by the Colorado long-arm statute.1 Instead, Frandsen contends that 
1
 Frandsen ignores the consequences of his contacts with 
Colorado and the obvious injury caused there. In fact, nowhere in 
hi brief does Frandsen deny his transmission to Colorado of a bad 
ch- ::k and breach of his agreement to pay Rocky Mountain for the 
ser/ices provided. 
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his contacts with Colorado were "[in]sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of the due procedss [sic] clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution." (Brief of Appellee, 
p. 10.) Moreover, as he must, Frandsen concedes that Colorado may 
exercise personal jurisdiction to the full extent "permitted by the 
due process clause." (Id. at 11 (citing Bradford v. Naale, 763 
P.2d 791, 793 (Utah 1980)).) However, Frandsen then asks this 
Court to engage in a personal jurisdiction analysis based upon only 
part of the story and ignoring most of the pertinent facts. 
Contrary to the undisputed facts presented to the District 
Court, Frandsen would have this Court believe that Rocky Mountain's 
claim "arises out of a conversation which took place in Salt Lake 
City . . . ." (Brief of Appellee, p. 5.) According to Frandsen's 
misstatement of the facts, Rocky Mountain's president, David 
Waldner, appears out of nowhere in Frandsen's office in Salt Lake 
City in February or March of 1991. Frandsen advises Waldner that 
he has no funds to pay for staking of the Idaho properties. (Id.. 
at 6.) 
But for the material facts omitted by Frandsen, this 
mysterious appearance would make no sense. However, as the record 
before the District Court indicates, prior to this visit, Frandsen 
initiated a call to Waldner at his office in Boulder, Colorado, to 
request that Rocky Mountain perform necessary claims staking 
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services on a group of Frandsen's unpatented mining claims in 
Idaho. (R. 62-63.) During this telephone conversation, Waldner 
and Frandsen enter into an agreement that Rocky Mountain would 
perform certain work at Frandsen's request. (Id.) Yet, 
conspicuously absent from Frandsen#s brief is any mention of this 
initial purposeful contact with Colorado or the oral agreement 
Frandsen made there for the claim staking services which 
subsequently led to the Colorado judgment. In fact, nowhere in the 
record below does Frandsen deny or contest in any way the fact of 
this telephone conversation or its substance. 
As demonstrated in the Brief of Appellant, the contract for 
services between the parties was entered into in Colorado. See, 
e.g. . 1 Corbin on Contracts, §79, p. 342; First Nat'l Bank of 
Beaver Oklahoma v. Hough. 643 F.2d 705, 706 (10th Cir. 1981). 
Moreover, the evidence of Frandsen's initiation of contacts with 
Rocky Mountain in Colorado and entry into the agreement there are 
uncontroverted. Indeed, Frandsen has not argued that his initial 
solicitation of Rocky Mountain did not result in a contract made in 
Colorado. 
Instead, Frandsen merely asserts, without any factual or legal 
support whatsoever, that "[t]he contract for staking services was 
made in Utah." (Brief of Appellee, p. 13.) But this bald 
assertion is directly controverted by Frandsen's own brief. 
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Incredibly, after describing Waldner's visit to Utah, Frandsen then 
states "the defendant did not contract with, authorize or agree to 
pay the plaintiff to stake any of Idaho mining claims." (Jd. at 
6.) Thus, Frandsen's assertion concerning the place of the 
agreement not only ignores material facts, but is internally 
inconsistent with his own statement that the Utah meeting did not 
result in any agreement. Of course, Frandsen's later conduct in 
transmitting the bad check to Colorado for the services he 
originally solicited is also inconsistent with his position that a 
contract did not exist. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that 
a contract did exist and was entered into in Colorado. 
Separate and apart from Frandsen's later acts directed toward 
Colorado, the undisputed facts concerning the formation of the 
relationship, ignored by Frandsen, demonstrate that Frandsen 
initiated contact with Rocky Mountain, contracted in Colorado and 
then breached that contract causing injury in Colorado. Those acts 
subject Frandsen to personal jurisdiction in Colorado. 
II. FRANDSEN #S NUMEROUS ACTS DIRECTED TOWARD COLORADO SATISFY DUE 
PROCESS. 
Frandsen concedes that "[i]n determining whether or not the 
exercise of jurisdiction by a Court offends the due process clause, 
each case must be evaluated on its own specific facts." (Brief of 
Appellee, p. 11.) Yet, after having made this admission, Frandsen 
fails to conduct any real analysis of the totality of the facts of 
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this case and relies upon two archaic decisions from the dark ages 
of personal jurisdiction, which are inapplicable here. 
As noted above, Frandsen initiated and solicited the services 
from Rocky Mountain in Colorado. (R. 62-63) After the requested 
services were performed, Rocky Mountain, a Colorado company, 
invoiced Frandsen. (R. 63) In response, Frandsen placed telephone 
calls and sent a negotiable instrument to Colorado. (Id.) 
Subsequently, Frandsen specifically directed the completion of the 
instrument and its negotiation, knowing there were no funds or 
deposits sufficient to pay the check. (R. 64) Frandsenfs acts 
were expressly aimed at Colorado. 
M[W]hen [a nonresident defendant's] intentional actions are 
expressly aimed at the forum state, and the [defendant] knows that 
the brunt of the injury will be felt by a particular resident in 
the forum, the [defendant] must reasonably anticipate being haled 
into court there to answer for its . . . actions." Romney v. St. 
John Virgin Grand Villas Associates, 734 F. Supp. 957, 962 (D. Utah 
1990) (citing the United States Supreme Court's effects rule from 
Calder v. Jones. 465 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1984)). Frandsen's failure 
to even respond to this argument is a tacit admission that it alone 
is sufficient to sustain Colorado's jurisdiction over Frandsen. 
Moreover, because Frandsen's contacts with Colorado resulted from 
his own affirmative acts which created a substantial connection 
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with the forum state, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
Frandsen in Colorado is particularly appropriate. See Burger King 
v. Rudzewicz. 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985). 
Further, Frandsen's reliance upon Cate Rental Co. v. Whalen & 
Co. , 549 P.2d 707 (Utah 1976) is misplaced. That case applied the 
later rejected "doing business" test to determine due process 
compliance in the exercise of jurisdiction. As was later explained 
in Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft, 578 P.2d 850 (Utah 
1978), the proper test even in Utah is the "minimum contacts" test. 
As a result, the viability of cases such as Cate Rental has been 
questioned by the Utah Supreme Court in Mallory Engineering v. Ted 
R. Brown & Assoc.. 618 P.2d 1004, 1006 (Utah 1980) and the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah in Nova Mud Corp. v. 
Fletcher, 648 F. Supp. 1123, 1125 (D. Utah 1986). Significantly, 
Frandsen in his brief failed to advise this Court of those 
decisions. 
Likewise, Frandsen's reliance on Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. 
Superior Court, 448 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1968) is also misplaced. In 
Safari Outfitters. plaintiff attempted to have the Colorado court 
exercise jurisdiction over an Illinois corporation because, among 
other things, plaintiff had sent a check from Colorado to Illinois. 
The court refused. That scenario is the exact opposite of the 
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present case, where the Defendant, Frandsen, sent the bad check to 
Colorado, where jurisdiction was properly exercised. 
Similarly, the decision in Ruggieri v. General Well Service, 
Inc., 535 F. Supp. 525 (D. Colo. 1982) does not support Frandsen's 
position. In Ruggieri, the court held that affirmative 
misrepresentations made to the plaintiff inducing justifiable 
reliance upon him in Colorado and causing damages in Colorado 
subjected the defendant to jurisdiction in Colorado. While the 
court found jurisdiction for the contract claim lacking, the 
defendant in Ruggieri did not send a bad check to Colorado 
intending that it be negotiated there, as did Frandsen. 
In the final analysis, based upon all of the relevant facts 
surrounding the relationship between the parties concerning this 
transaction, the Court must determine whether a sufficient nexus 
exists between Frandsen and Colorado to satisfy due process. As 
noted in Kamdar & Co. v. Laray Co., Inc., 815 P.2d 245, 249 (Utah 
App. 1991), "[i]n undertaking interstate business [the defendants] 
must recognize and accommodate . . . the probability and necessity 
of litigating in foreign forums." (Citing Mallory Eng'g v. Ted R. 
Brown & Assoc.. 618 P.2d 1004, 1009 (Utah 1980)). 
Colorado has consistently upheld its interest in adjudicating 
disputes involving negotiable instruments sent to Colorado for 
negotiation and payment. Colorado has provided specific remedies 
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for its residents, such as Rocky Mountain, who are the victims of 
bad checks. Indeed, Colorado has adopted legislation to protect 
its residents from injury caused by bad checks. When Frandsen 
directed the completion and negotiation of that instrument in 
Colorado, knowing that it could not then be paid, Frandsen 
certainly should have foreseen that he could be haled into a 
Colorado court to answer for the consequences of his actions. 
Therefore, it would be unjust to allow Frandsen to avoid liability 
for his purposeful acts that caused injury in Colorado when 
Frandsen had sufficient contacts with Colorado. 
CONCLUSION 
The Colorado court properly exercised personal jurisdiction 
over Frandsen. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the District 
Court's Order vacating the judgment. 
DATED: December g*3 * 1993. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
fhomas R. Karrenberg j£* 
Scott A. Call ' 
10 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^ jj day of December, 1993, I 
caused to be mailed, via first class mail, in the United States 
Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the within and 
foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, to: 
Merlin 0. Baker, Esq. 
3760 South Highland Drive 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
11 
